2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-8-2012

Wayne Spence v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"Wayne Spence v. Attorney General United States" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 590.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/590

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1415
___________
WAYNE ANTONIO SPENCE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A040-098-031)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo Finston
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 7, 2012
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE AND BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 8, 2012)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Wayne Antonio Spence petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) decision denying his motion for reconsideration.
For the following reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review.

Spence, a native and citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States in 1986 as a
lawful permanent resident. In 2007, he was convicted in New Jersey State court of
aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to six years of imprisonment. The Department
of Homeland Security subsequently issued a Notice to Appear, charging Spence with
removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
At an administrative hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that
Spence’s 2007 conviction is both an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime,
rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ did allow
Spence to present testimony to determine his eligibility for protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Spence testified that he believes that if he returns
to Jamaica, he will be harmed because he would be perceived as an outsider in the
neighborhood in which he last resided. Spence also claimed the area where he last lived,
Montego Bay, is rife with violent criminal activity and that he was robbed at gunpoint
during a 1996 visit. The IJ concluded that Spence failed to demonstrate that he is likely
to face harm rising to the level of torture. Further, the IJ concluded that even if Spence
had made such a showing, there is no indication that a public official would likely
acquiesce in or exhibit willful blindness toward his torture.
On December 5, 2011, the BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ and dismissed
Spence’s administrative appeal. Spence did not petition for review of that decision;
instead, he timely requested that the BIA reconsider its decision. On January 20, 2012,
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the BIA denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that rather than specifying any
errors of fact or law in its previous decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), the
motion “erroneously attributes statements to the Board that are not found in [the]
decision.” The Board also rejected Spence’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), required the Board to reconsider its
decision. This petition for review, which was timely filed from the denial of Spence’s
motion for reconsideration, followed.
We must first address our jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review. The
Government correctly argues we lack jurisdiction to review arguments that were not
exhausted before the BIA. Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). In
his petition for review, Spence argues that, in affirming the IJ’s decision, the Board failed
to consider an “equal protection” argument related to his “length of stay in the United
States, family ties, [and] work history.” (Pet. Br. at 5.) However, Spence did not present
this argument to the BIA in his motion for reconsideration. (A.R. at 5-8.) His failure to
do so constitutes a failure to exhaust, thus depriving us of jurisdiction to consider the
argument. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119-21 (3d Cir. 2008). 1
Spence also attempts to challenge the Board’s December 5, 2011 decision
upholding the IJ’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief. Spence’s petition for review, however, is timely only as to the Board’s denial of
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We note that this is not the type of constitutional claim that we have authority to review
in the absence of exhaustion. See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005).
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his motion for reconsideration. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (the finality
of a removal order is not affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider).
Inasmuch as neither Spence in his motion to reconsider, nor the Board in its decision
denying reconsideration, addressed the denial of his application for asylum and related
relief, his present challenge to the denial of that application is not reviewable. See
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In sum, Spence has not raised any claims over which we have jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review.
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